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EMPOWERING PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AS A PATHWAY TO 
PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE 
Francesco Seatzu1* 
 
ABSTRACT—Recent years have witnessed a growing awareness of the 
importance of the status of persons with disabilities as right-holders, and 
increasing linkages being made between human rights and persons with 
disabilities’ vulnerabilities in the development context. Stimulated by 
mounting concerns about the impact of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 on 
persons with disabilities, these changes have unsurprisingly catalyzed 
attention on those rights of persons with disabilities that are most closely 
connected to ensuring persons with disabilities’ development needs—
namely their social and economic rights. Focusing on the content of, and 
duties imposed by, persons with disabilities’ socio-economic rights, this 
article starts by describing the notions of “disability” and “disabled persons.” 
It then discusses the emergence of persons with disabilities as socio-
economic rights holders, focusing on the question of whether persons with 
disabilities are or should be considered a “special case” vis-à-vis such rights 
when compared with other vulnerable groups. The article concludes with a 
discussion of the role domestic courts can and should play in the enforcement 
of the socio-economic rights contained in the UN Convention on the Rights 
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This work looks at persons with disabilities and their social and 
economic rights. It also discusses when and how competent national judicial 
authorities may be called upon to implement such rights. With regard to this 
latter issue, the focus will be on competent national judicial authorities of 
developing countries. The focus on developing countries is for the simple 
reason that the majority of the world’s disabled people—about 80 percent—
currently live in developing countries, as shown by some recent figures from 
University College London.2 These issues are addressed in three stages. 
First, the work describes the notions of social rights and disability 
employed throughout it. In so doing, it pays special attention to the core 
issues that arise in the conceptualization of persons with disabilities as socio-
economic rights holders. This demands a consideration of the implications 
of different systems of disabilityhood and persons with disabilities from 
societal, political, and normative perspectives. Moreover, it examines the 
treatment of persons with disabilities under the United Nations (UN) 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)3 and its 
related Optional Protocol.4 The CRPD, adopted in 2006 and signed or ratified 
 
 2 See Sophie Mitra et al., Disability and Poverty in Developing Countries: A Snapshot from the World 
Health Survey, SOCIAL PROTECTION & LABOR THE WORLD BANK, Discussion Paper No. 1109, 1109 
(Apr. 2011), 
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1566&context=gladnetcollect. 
 3 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 4 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2518 
U.N.T.S. 283. 
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by 163 countries from all over the world,5 declares universal rights of every 
person with a disability, including some social and economic rights for 
disabled persons, such as the right to education, health, habilitation and 
rehabilitation, work and employment, adequate living and protection.6 
Secondly, the work discusses the special place occupied by persons 
with disabilities with respect to socio-economic rights breaches and 
considers whether persons with disabilities are or should be considered a 
“special case” vis-à-vis such rights when compared with other vulnerable 
groups. This is in parallel to a discussion of the alleged features and the 
definition of socio-economic rights as “real” human rights with an aim to 
reject objections against judicial implementation of such rights. It also 
emphasizes and legitimizes the role of international human rights and public 
international law.  
Lastly, the work focuses on the role of domestic courts in the 
enforcement of the socio-economic rights contained in the CRPD by 
outlining the situations in which these courts could intervene and what action 
they could adopt. 
II. THE DEFINITIONS OF “PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES” AND 
“DISABILITY” 
The first step is to define the subjects of this work: that is, “persons with 
disabilities.” Notwithstanding the efforts of the World Health Organization 
(WHO),7 the specialized branch of the UN concerned with public health, the 
meaning of “disability” and consequently that of “person with disability” still 
varies significantly. In my view, this depends on the different ways of 
“seeing” disability according to the social model of disability and according 
to the medical model of disability. In a nutshell, “disability,” according to 
the social model, is defined as a situation that derives from social constraints 
and structures. This is in sharp contrast to how disability has been defined 
by the supporters of the “medical model of disability”: namely, as a condition 
 
 5 For a chart of signatures and ratifications of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, see CRPD List of Countries by Signature : Confirmation: Accession : Ratification, DISABLED 
WORLD (Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.disabled-world.com/disability/discrimination/crpd-milestone.php. 
 6 See Francesco Seatzu, Social rights as persons with disabilities’ rights, RES. HANDBOOK INT’L L. 
AND SOC. RTS., 224 (2020). 
 7 INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF FUNCTIONING, DISABILITY AND HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2001), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/42407/9241545429.pdf;jsessionid=E775B4BADC286
D56EF10FFA94F6A1084?sequence=1. See also G. Stucki et al., Application of the International 
Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) in clinical practice, 24 DISABILITY AND 
REHAB. 281, 281–82 (2009). 
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deriving from personal “deficiencies” to be solved by means of policies 
directed at normalizing those who “suffer” them.8 
While there are similarities between the definitions of disability in some 
areas of social policy, legal disability definitions in each country—and often 
in each legal instrument—differ with respect to non-discrimination and 
employment measures, income maintenance, and social assistance with daily 
life activities.9 Emblematic of this is the evolution of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),10 the “primary statutory vehicle for the 
educational rights of persons with disabilities in the United States” according 
to the U.S. National Council on Disability.11 Until October 2010, the term 
“mental retardation”12 was preferred to that of “intellectual disability.”13 
Perhaps even more emblematic is the evolution in the interpretation of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), which forbids 
discrimination in federally funded activities and programs.14 As Paul 
Longmore indicates, though the original aim of the Rehabilitation Act did 
not intend to cover all forms of discrimination, the broad language of Section 
504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act was eventually interpreted by the 
implementing agency to ban all forms of discrimination in the public sector.15 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) also do not supply a workable definition 
 
 8 See Agustina Palacios, The Social Model in the International Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, 4 AGE HUM. RTS. J. 91, 91 (2015) (citing CRISTINA CHURRUCA MUGURUZA ET AL., 
VULNERABILITY AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS  (M. Carmen Barranco Avilés & Cristina Churruca 
Muguruza eds., 2014)). 
 9 See Helen Bolderson & Deborah Mabbett, Non-Discriminating Social Policy? Policy scenarios for 
meeting needs without categorisation, in WHAT FUTURE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY? DEBATES AND REFORMS 
IN NATIONAL AND CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 53, 54 (Jochen Clasen ed., 2001). 
 10 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1990). 
 11 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, FINDING THE GAPS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
DISABILITY LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (CRPD) 90 (2008). 
 12 See, e.g., THE ICD-10 CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL AND BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS: CLINICAL 
DESCRIPTIONS AND DIAGNOSTIC GUIDELINES 15 (1992) (recalling that the term “mental retardation” was 
used in the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-IV (1994) and in the World Health Organization’s 
ICD-10 (codes F70–F79)). 
 13 See Kevin Walker, Comparing American Disability Laws to the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities with Respect to Postsecondary Education for Persons with Intellectual 
Disabilities, 12 NW. J INT’L HUM. RTS. 115, 117 n.16 (2014). See also Luis Salvador-Carulla, Marco 
Bertelli, “Mental Retardation” or “Intellectual Disability”: Time for a Conceptual Change 41 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 10 (2008) (recalling that the term “mental retardation” was gradually changed after 
2010 because of its negative and insulting connotation and offensiveness). 
 14 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1973) (amended 1998). For a commentary, see, e.g., Anne B. Thomas, Beyond 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 22 N.M. L. REV. 243 
(1992). 
 15 See PAUL K. LONGMORE, WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY 104 
(2003). 
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of disability. Nevertheless, this has not hindered either of the two courts from 
moving in the direction of developing their own case-law on disability issues. 
To elucidate this point, the ECtHR has given a number of important 
decisions that have had an impact on disability laws, policies and procedures, 
notably in Bulgaria,16 France,17 Poland,18 the United Kingdom,19 the 
Netherlands,20 and Italy.21 Similarly, one can also recall that the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACcHR) and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) have also developed a rich case-law and 
practice on the protection of the fundamental rights of persons with 
disabilities,22 recently culminating in the IACcHR’s ruling on an emergency 
“precautionary measures petition” filed by Disability Rights International 
(DRI) on behalf of more than 300 children and adults at Federico Mora 
Hospital in Guatemala.23 That being said, both courts have followed the 
ECtHR’s lead in failing to clarify the operative meaning of the term 
“disability.”24 
But this is not all. One can also recall the MDAC v. Belgium case,25 
where the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) found Belgium in 
breach of the European Social Charter (ESC) for failing to provide education 
and training for children with intellectual disabilities who are denied access 
to mainstream education and to the forms of support necessary to ensure such 
 
 16 See generally Nencheva & Others v. Bulgaria, App. No. 48609/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-120956. 
 17 See generally Vincent v. France, App. No. 6253/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-77641. 
 18 See generally Zarzycki v. Poland, App. No. 15351/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-117210. 
 19 See generally Aswat v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 17299/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-118583. 
 20 See generally X & Y v. the Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1985), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57603. 
 21 See Francesco Seatzu, Does the European Convention on Human Rights Protect the Disabled?, 8 
ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 397, 397–420 (2014). 
 22 See D. Guarnizo-Peralta, Disability rights in the Inter-American System of Human Rights, 36 
NETH. Q. OF HUM. RTS. 43 (2018). 
 23 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights orders Guatemala to protect children and 
adults from abuses in psychiatric facility, DISABILITY RTS. INT’L. (Nov. 28, 2012), 
https://www.driadvocacy.org/inter-american-commission-on-human-rights-orders-guatemala-to-
protect-children-and-adults-from-abuses-in-psychiatric-facility/. 
 24 See Analía Banfi & Sofía Galvan, Los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad y la Comisión 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 
(Nov. 10, 2014), 
http://repositoriocdpd.net:8080/bitstream/handle/123456789/1303/Art_GalvanPuenteS_DerechosComis
ionInteramericana_2014.pdf?sequence=1. 
 25 See Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC) v. Belgium, Complaint No. 109/2014, Decision, 
EUR. COMM’N OF SOC. RTS. (Oct. 16, 2017), http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng?i=cc-109-2014-
dadmissandmerits-en. 
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inclusion.26 But still, the issue of the definition of the term “disability” has 
not been addressed as such by the ECSR. This is in spite of this Committee 
monitoring an international legal instrument that, at Article 15, explicitly 
refers to the right of persons with disabilities to independence, social 
integration, and participation in the life of the community.27 Nevertheless, 
given that supervisory body’s extensive reliance on the case-law of the 
ECtHR in areas of overlap between the ECHR and ESC,28 should a question 
of the definition of “disability” or of “persons with disabilities” arise before 
it, the ECSR Committee would most likely enact a corresponding approach 
to the expansive and inclusive one that has been implicitly adopted by the 
ECtHR in its disability line of cases.29 
In light of the preponderant approach of international and regional 
human rights law, as well as the wide diversity of approaches at national 
level, this work aligns itself with the broad notion of “disability” that is 
implicitly encompassed in the CRPD through reference to the social model 
understanding of disability—that is the belief that disability is a socially 
constructed entity rather than a medicalized pathology.30 This is not to ignore 
the fact that in some domestic legal systems the constitutional framework 
leads to a much less inclusive definition.31 In particular, this occurs in those 
legal systems that adopt, either explicitly or implicitly, the traditional 
 
 26 See Giuseppe Palmisano, Protecting the Rights of Persons with Autism: the Role of the European 
Committee of Social Rights, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMANITY: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF FLAVIA LATTANZI 90, 90–104 (Pia Acconci et al. eds., 2017). 
 27 European Social Charter (revised) art. 15, May 3 1996, 163 E.T.S. (“With a view to ensuring . . . 
the effective exercise of the right to independence, social integration and participation in the life of the 
community, the Parties undertake . . . (1) to take necessary measures to provide persons with disabilities 
with guidance, education and vocational training . . . (2) to promote their access to employment through 
all measures tending to encourage employers to hire and keep in employment persons with 
disabilities . . . .”). 
 28 See Dovilė Gailiūtė, Right to Housing in the Jurisprudence of the European Committee of Social 
Rights, 4 SOCIETAL STUD. 1605 (2012). See also Francesco Seatzu, Enhancing a Principled Justificatory 
Model of Adjudication for the Protection of Human Rights in the Socio-Economic Sphere—The Impact 
of the European Social Charter on the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 15 GLOBAL 
COMMUNITY Y.B. INT’L. L. AND JURISPRUDENCE 247 (2015). 
 29 See Emily Hazlett, Disability Rights in a Post-Convention Era: Protecting Legal Capacity at the 
European Court and Beyond, 2 INT’L. HUM. RTS. INTERNSHIP WORKING PAPER SERIES 11 (2014). 
 30 On the social model understanding of disability, see, e.g., Mike Oliver, The Social Model in Action: 
if I had a hammer, in IMPLEMENTING THE SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH 
LEEDS 18 (Colin Barnes & Geof Mercer eds., 2004); Rannveig Traustadottir, Disability Studies, the Social 
Model and Legal Developments, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES: EUROPEAN AND SCANDINAVIAN PERSPECTIVES 3 (Oddný Arnadóttir & Gerard Quinn eds., 
2009). For some recent criticisms of this model, see Janine Owens, Exploring the critiques of the social 
model of disability: the transformative possibility of Arendt’s notion of power, 37 SOC. OF HEALTH & 
ILLNESS 385 (2015). 
 31 See HEALTH CARE FOR PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 
ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 418 (I. Leslie Rubin et al. eds., 2016). 
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medical model understanding of disability, the central tenets of which are 
that a person’s “impairment” can be diagnosed, cured, or at least 
rehabilitated by medicine and/or medical technology and that such 
interventions will be provided by all-knowing professionals.32 
III. THE EMERGENCE OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES AS SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS HOLDERS 
Having indicated who we are considering here, it is appropriate to 
clarify why it is indispensable to take these people into consideration. It is 
important that more observation be given to persons with disabilities as 
socio-economic rights holders, autonomous from the community to which 
they belong. Persons with disabilities are currently acknowledged as a 
minority rights group.33 Indirectly, this is confirmed by the existence of an 
ad hoc human rights treaty (the CRPD), and also by the shared experience 
of discrimination, oppression and suffering that persons with disabilities 
share with other minority groups in society like, and in particular with, 
elderly people34 and children.35 Throughout the world, especially in 
developing countries, disabled persons cannot exercise significant legal or 
strategic economic influence and are generally, ultimately excluded from the 
large majority of societal organizations, whether labor or political in nature.36 
Conventionally, in regarding persons with disabilities—particularly persons 
with intellectual disabilities—as a discrete category of individuals, Western 
societies usually set them aside as incompetent individuals who are 
“inferior” to non-disabled individuals and whose enjoyment of fundamental 
freedoms and rights is conditioned upon the views of the state or legal 
guardians, or both.37 
 
 32 See Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 221 (2000). 
 33 See Corey Leshandon Moore, The Minority Group Model and Persons With Disabilities: Toward 
a More Progressive Disability Public Policy in the United States of America, 4 AUSTL. J. REHAB. COUNS. 
36 (1998). 
 34 See, e.g, Mutamad Amin et al., EquiFrame: A framework for analysis of the inclusion of human 
rights and vulnerable groups in health policies, 13 HEALTH AND HUM. RTS. J. 82 (2011). 
 35 On the classification of children as belonging to a minority group, see Daniel Thomas Cook, 
Minority Group, Children as, in THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHILDREN AND CHILDHOOD STUDIES 1111 
(Daniel Thomas Cook ed., 2020) (recalling that “children can be understood as a minority group in 
different ways, including as the last minority—a social group that has not yet achieved equal rights.”). 
 36 See Joanne Neille & Claire Penn, Beyond Physical Access: a qualitative analysis into the barriers 
to policy implementation and service provision experienced by persons with disabilities living in a rural 
context, 15 RURAL AND REMOTE HEALTH (2015); Gobinda C. Pal, Disability, Intersectionality and 
Deprivation: An Excluded Agenda, 23 PSYCHOL. & DEVELOPING SOC’T. 159 (2011). 
 37 See, e.g., Hélène Ouellette-Kuntz et al., Public Attitudes Towards Individuals with Intellectual 
Disabilities as Measured by the Concept of Social Distance, 23 J. APPLIED RES. INTELL. DISABILITIES 
134 (2010). 
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Clearly, the considerations made above and below in this work about 
persons with disabilities may be rejected as wide-ranging conjectures that 
characterize persons with disabilities as an alike group whose views and 
interests are similar and who are confronted with the same challenges. But, 
of course, they are not. Similar to other social groups, persons with 
disabilities differ from each other in terms of race, socioeconomic status, and 
gender. Nevertheless, I would maintain that persons with disabilities are 
similar enough in terms of common features—such as needs, lifestyle, and 
legal and political status—for it to be admissible to refer to “persons with 
disabilities” in building my line of reasoning. 
The main reason there has been little consideration of persons with 
disabilities as holders of social and economic rights is that, until recently, 
disabled people were regarded as recipients of charitable acts and goodwill, 
rather than as fundamental freedoms and rights-bearers themselves.38 
Traditionally, persons with disabilities were not deemed to be independent 
actors enhancing social processes. As a result, they did not achieve 
consideration as a distinct group, justified by the perception that they are the 
responsibility of their legal guardians. In fact, giving persons with disabilities 
lifelong “dependent” status was functional to placing them outside the 
socially active community. 
The perception of persons with disabilities as rooted in a relationship 
with a legal guardian that is able to meet their needs fails to take into account 
the fact that the relationship between legal guardians and disabled persons 
does not establish an identity of disabled persons interests. As several authors 
have pointed out, a failure to consider the persons with disabilities’ claim to 
resources as autonomous of the disabled-legal guardian relationship results 
in a failure to recognize the position of persons with disabilities as separate 
members of the social community with separate interests.39 
Persons with disabilities’ social conditions are strongly connected with 
those of the people who take care of them. Nevertheless, although resources 
are often given to persons with (intellectual) disabilities by close relatives,40 
this is not invariably the case. The idea that family relationships are 
unavoidably supported by general principles of social justice misses the fact 
 
 38 See ARLENE S. KANTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISABILITY RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
FROM CHARITY TO HUMAN RIGHTS 30 (2015), 
 39 Neil H. Mickenberg, The Silent Clients: Legal and Ethical Considerations in Representing 
Severely and Profoundly Retarded Individuals, 31 STAN. L. REV. 625, 630 (1979); Nina A. Kohn et al., 
Supported Decision Making: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship, 177 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1111, 1117 
(2013). 
 40 See Brian Grossman & Sandy Magaña, Introduction to the special issue: Family Support of 
Persons with Disabilities Across the Life Course, 19 JOURNAL OF FAMILY SOCIAL WORK 237, 239–41 
(2007). 
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that the family is not affected by the attitudes of society. Indeed, like any 
other social entity, the family mirrors public assumptions that are still 
disablist in nature. Moreover, the idea that persons with disabilities’ socio-
economic rights-related needs will be taken care of by their caregivers or 
close relatives—compounded by the fact that the traditional predilection of 
the state is to provide for persons with disabilities’ social entitlements 
through the family unit—may disadvantage those persons with disabilities 
who do not have family caregivers that are able to help. There has also been 
a failure to adequately consider persons with disabilities’ needs when 
examining the needs of “households” that leads to an undervaluation of the 
needs of the disabled-members and to an excessive consideration of those 
without disabilities, i.e. other members of the household.41 
Essentially, the recurrent transfer of social rights-connected resources 
from relatives to persons with disabilities neither abolishes nor invalidates 
the duty of the state to persons with disabilities. In addition to its default task 
of supplying social freedoms and rights where family caregivers have 
difficulty to or are unable to do so, there are specific socio-economic rights—
such as the right to ensure maternity leave for working mothers, the right to 
a healthy environment, and the right to social security—that only the state 
can deliver. It is essential that persons with disabilities’ entitlements to 
resources be considered as autonomous of the family caregiver-person. 
There have been advancements in terms of attitudes and approaches to 
persons with disabilities. Disabled persons, especially intellectually disabled 
persons, are less frequently viewed as an extension of their relatives and legal 
guardians, at least for States Parties to the CRPD, but as individuals with 
their own fundamental freedoms and rights. Nevertheless, persons with 
disabilities are still severely disadvantaged in society as compared to non-
disabled persons. And this is so despite the entry into force of the CRPD that 
has marked a “paradigm shift” in the rights of people with disabilities.42 This 
point has been well captured by writers who claim that “disablism”—that is 
the discriminatory, oppressive or abusive behavior of non-disabled toward 
persons with disabilities—has the same negative impact on the lives of 
 
 41 See Alissa C. Stevens et al., Adults with One or More Functional Disabilities—United States, 
2011–2014, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 1021, 1021 (Sept. 30, 2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/pdfs/mm6538.pdf (also stressing that acknowledging the 
characteristics of persons living with multiple disability types would be of strategic importance for 
understanding the overall functional status of these individuals). 
 42 Ida E. Koch, From Invisibility to Indivisibility: The International Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, in THE UN CONVENTIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: 
EUROPEAN AND SCANDINAVIAN PERSPECTIVES 67, 67–77 (2009); Paul Harpur, Embracing the New 
Disability Rights Paradigm: The Importance of the Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities, 
27 DISABILITY & SOCIETY 1, 3–5 (2012); Teodor Mladenov, The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities and its Interpretation, 7 ALTE-EURO. J. DISABILITY 69, 72 (2013). 
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persons with disabilities as the disability per se.43 Moreover, other authors, 
in similar terms, maintain that disabilityhood as a social condition is still 
defined within the social order as inferior to non-disabilityhood.44 
Persons with disabilities have a different position in society from that 
of other socially disadvantaged individuals. Ramon Puig and Stephen von 
Tetzchner express this clearly by stressing the existence of a paradox 
throughout history, according to which “the problem for people with 
disabilities, unlike the problem for older persons and children (two other 
groups of vulnerable subjects), has not been a lack of integration, but, rather, 
an unfulfilled form of ‘integration,’ with limited possibilities for education, 
work and social life.”45 On such a view of persons with disabilities, disabled 
dependence must be approached and resolved through political or social 
development. Puig and von Tetzchner’s claims deserve to be taken seriously. 
Puig and von Tetzchner explain that the “dependence” of disabled persons is 
to a large extent the result of cultural, social, and historical approaches 
towards, and treatment of, persons with disabilities, rather than constituting 
an unavoidable outcome of disabilityhood itself.46 Flawed perceptions of 
disabled persons as non-autonomous and dependent have led to a vicious 
cycle. Erroneous views on persons with disabilities are strengthened by the 
restricted chances for persons with disabilities to prove their competence. 
Strictly connected to this is the deleterious influence of the eugenic, an 
ideology that was prevalent both in Western Europe and the United States in 
the early twentieth century.47 
Judicial consciousness of the weak and disadvantaged position of 
persons with disabilities in the enjoyment of human rights, including socio-
economic rights, is clearly shown in ECtHR case-law. In Guberina v. 
Croatia, the ECtHR observed that: 
the alleged discriminatory treatment of the applicant on 
account of the disability of his child, with whom he has close 
personal links and for whom he provides care, is a form of 
 
 43 For further references on this point, see e.g., MICHAEL W.J. SCHILLMEIER, RETHINKING 
DISABILITY: BODIES, SENSES AND THINGS 5 (2010); Shelly Tremain, On the Subject of Impairment, in 
DISABILITY/POSTMODERNITY: EMBODYING DISABILITY THEORY 32 (Corker & Shakespeare eds., 2002). 
 44 See, e.g., Tom Shakespeare, Back to the future? New genetics and disabled people, 1 CRITICAL 
SOC. POL’Y 20 (1995); Paul Abberley, The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social 
Theory of Disability, 2 DISABILITY, HANDICAP & SOC’Y 5 (1987). 
 45 See Ramon Puig & Stephen von Tetzchner, The Disabled Person in Society: an Historical 
Perspective in Issues, in TELECOMMUNICATION AND DISABILITY 623 (Tetzchner ed., 1991). 
 46 Id. 
 47 David Pfeiffer, Eugenics and Disability Discrimination, 9 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 481 (1994). 
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disability-based discrimination covered by Article 14 of the 
Convention.48 
This statement reflects a perception of disability dependence as something 
that shall not in any case be used to prevent the effective exercise of 
fundamental rights including socio-economic rights, like the right to 
housing. A similar line of reasoning is found in Enver Şahin v. Turkey.49 
Here, the ECHR maintained that neither economic nor time constraints can 
justify the refusal or delay of the State in introducing the necessary changes 
to the environment that would permit any persons (including persons with 
disabilities) to exercise their right to education.50 
IV. SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AS “REAL” HUMAN RIGHTS 
Before moving to discuss the legitimacy and efficacy of the domestic 
courts’ enforcement of persons with disabilities’ socio-economic rights, it is 
necessary to consider some of the objections that have been traditionally 
posed to the competent national judicial authorities becoming involved in the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights. Here, the focus will be on objections 
related to the characteristics or nature of socio-economic rights that the large 
majority of legal authors have for decades identified as incompatible with 
their judicial implementation and constitutionalization. In enumerating these 
objections, I will follow the structure for the judicial enforcement of socio-
economic rights provided by Natasha G. Menell,51 as well as the discussion 
contained in Jeff King’s book titled Judging Social Rights.52 
First, according to the “democratic objection,” judicial implementation 
of socio-economic rights restricts the scope of the democratic decision-
making process.53 Supporting this conclusion is the idea that a single judicial 
decision may oblige the political branches of government to treat an 
individual beneficiary or class of beneficiaries differently, or eventually to 
adjust democratically developed policies.54 For the supporters of this view, 
the judicial implementation of socio-economic rights poses two structural 
 
 48 Guberina v. Croatia, App. No. 23682/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 28 (2016), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-161530. 
 49 Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. 115 (2005), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70956. 
 50 Id. at 36–37. 
 51 See Natasha G. Menell, Judicial Enforcement of Socioeconomic Rights: A Comparison between 
Transformative Projects in India and South Africa, 49 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 723 (2016). 
 52 See JEFF KING, JUDGING SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012). 
 53 See Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, in 
EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 21, 21–24, 35–38 (Daphne Barak-Erez 
& Aeyal M. Gross eds., 2007). 
 54 See Natasha G. Menell, supra note 51, at 727. 
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concerns. 55 The first concern is that of the separation of powers between the 
democratic branches and the judicial branch, because it gives courts the 
possibility to “invalidate choices as to the allocation of financial resources 
that are fundamentally political.”56 Second, implementation of socio-
economic rights raises questions related to judicial capacity. And this is for 
the very reason that judges are neither in theory nor in practice the best-
placed state entities to evaluate potential policy options and select between 
priorities.”57 
Unlike executive officers and legislators, competent domestic judicial 
authorities arguably lack democratic accountability.58 Nevertheless, as 
Michelman has rightly pointed out, this objection fails to consider that socio-
economic rights may also be formulated in a narrower form.59 States can draft 
socio-economic rights as duties for the state to pursue progressive and 
gradual realization, rather than as absolute individual rights, providing 
greater policy flexibility.60 
The second objection is generally known as the “contractarian 
objection.”61 At the heart of this objection is the idea that enforcement of 
socio-economic rights is not easy to measure, which allows the 
circumventing of citizens’ abilities to evaluate adherence to the state’s 
constitutional duties.62 The vagueness of the level of achievement of socio-
economic rights makes it hard for citizens to establish whether political 
policy choices effectively breach or respect their rights.63 This might lead to 
a perceived failure of democratic legitimacy because citizens are not 
correctly informed on the performance of their political leaders.64 Michelman 
suggests this objection, too, can be dismissed.65 Notwithstanding that 
reasonable citizens can differ in their evaluations of the realization of a socio-
economic right, they can agree on a wide spectrum of acceptable procedures 
and policy choices for assigning priorities.66 If reasonable citizens perceive 
constitutional social rights as establishing bounds on the acceptable policy 
 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See Natasha G. Menell, supra note 51, at 727. 
 59 See Michelman, supra note 53, at 32–33. 
 60 Id. at 32. 
 61 See MENELL, supra note 51, at 728. 
 62 Id. at 728. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id.. 
 65 See MICHELMAN, supra note 53, at 32. 
 66 Id. at 32–33. 
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space, then they can relatively easily determine the extent to which national 
legislators have kept within those boundaries.67 
Another frequently made objection to courts adjudicating socio-
economic rights is that socio-economic rights radically differ from civil and 
political rights given the former involves the expenditure of resources, while 
the latter are without costs.68 But even this claim is far from being true for 
various reasons. For instance, indicating which rights are social and which 
ones are not, even assuming that such language can be used, is never as 
simple as could be presumed.69 This is certainly true when analyzing socio-
economic rights and rights that are instrumental to promoting development. 
There is a great deal of interdependence and overlap between civil and socio-
economic rights, on the one hand, and between socio-economic rights 
amongst themselves on the other.70 For example, the right of all peoples to 
self-determination that is encompassed both in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights71 and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,72 as well as the right of minorities to enjoy their 
own culture in community with other members offer two vivid confirmations 
of this interdependence and possible overlaps.73 
V. THE SPECIAL CASE OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 
While civil and political rights were, for a long time, marginal in the 
discussion of disability rights, socio-economic rights were greatly debated 
and perceived as being of critical importance by disability activists and 
disability studies scholars, and this was so even during the early times of the 
 
 67 See Rehan Abeyratne, Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian Constitution: Toward a Broader 
Conception of Legitimacy, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014). 
 68 See Cecile Fabre, Constitutionalising Social Rights, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 263 (1998); Aryeh Neier, 
Social and Economic Rights: A Critique, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (2006); Katharine G. Young, The 
Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content, 33 YALE INT’L L. J. 113 
(2008). 
 69 See Virginia Mantouvalou, The Case for Social Rights, 6 GEO. L. FAC. PUBL’N & OTHER WORKS 
10–18 (2010). 
 70 See Neil Hibbert, Human Rights and Social Justice, 6 LAWS (2017). 
 71 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S 3. (providing for the right of all peoples to self-determination). 
 72 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(providing for the right of all peoples to self-determination). 
 73 See Martin Scheinin, The Justiciability of Social Rights: From Theory to Practice, in SOCIAL 
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 549 
(Malcolm Langford ed., 2008) (“Article 27 on minority rights represents an explicit extension by the 
ICCPR into the field of economic, social and cultural rights.”). 
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various disability movements.74 The reason behind this focus on social rights 
is the traditional conceptualization of disability rights in terms of social and 
welfare rights, which was, incidentally, the only coherent element of the 
initial paternalistic approach to disability.75 Having said that, there is no 
question that social rights, such as those relating to adequate social 
protection, work, education and livelihood, are of strategic importance for 
articulating demands by and for disabled persons. The expansive language 
of Article 24 of the CRPD76 which provides not only that children with 
disabilities should not be discriminated against but also that they should be 
able to participate in the general education system77 indirectly confirms this 
conclusion in relation to the right to education.78 
Although the nature of the socio-economic rights breaches experienced 
by persons with disabilities and other socio-economically disadvantaged 
groups can be analogous, it is of key relevance to stress that persons with 
disabilities face different challenges in terms of the assertion of their socio-
economic rights than do several other vulnerable groups. It is not that persons 
with disabilities are more fragile than all other social groups but only that 
they are differently fragile.79 Persons with disabilities share several of the 
problems faced by children, including traditional subjection to charity and 
paternalistic measures. Unlike disadvantaged children and like women and 
older persons however, they represent a cross-class minority of the 
population. Persons with disabilities are not uniformly discriminated against. 
Again, on paper at least, they may obtain more sympathy than other socially 
vulnerable groups, like prisoners and irregular migrants who are often 
rejected by more privileged segments of the society. If persons with 
disabilities are more sympathetic figures than irregular migrants and 
 
 74 See Janet E. Lord & Michael A. Stein, The Domestic Incorporation of Human Rights Law and the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 83 WASH. L. REV. 449, 450, 460 
(2008). 
 75 See Arlene Kanter, The Promise and Challenge of the United Nations Convention on the Right of 
Persons with Disabilities, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 11 (2007). 
 76 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 24, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 77 See Gauthier de Beco, The Right to Inclusive Education According to Article 24 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Background, Requirements and (Remaining) 
Questions, 32 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 264 (2014). 
 78 See Dimitris Anastasiou et al., Article 24: Education, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS 
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 670 (Ilias Bantekas et al. eds., 2018) (stressing that “paragraph 1 of 
Article 28 is appropriately (and even inspiringly) expansive in its vision of educational attainment for 
PWD . . . .”). 
 79 See, Johan Lievens & Marie Spinoy, Dupin v. France: the ECtHR going old school in its appraisal 
of inclusive education?, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2019/02/11/dupin-v-france-the-ecthr-going-old-school-in-its-appraisal-
of-inclusive-education/#more-4304 (stressing that “education for children with a disability concerns a 
complex service to organize in a world of finite resources.”). 
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prisoners, then there is arguably more likely to be a lobby group ready to ask 
for measures aimed at vindicating their rights than would exist for prisoners 
or irregular migrants. Moreover, while discrimination on the grounds of 
imprisonment or on the basis of illegal immigration status is still generally 
allowed, discrimination on the grounds of disability is always considered 
unacceptable as indirectly confirmed by the adoption and enactment of the 
CRPD,80 and of the Optional Protocol (OP) that allows for an individual 
citizen of a ratifying country to make a direct complaint to the UN CRPD 
Committee about his or her treatment/discrimination,81 and also by the 
ECtHR’s case-law relating to persons with disabilities.82 In relation to the 
latter, reference is made to the ECtHR’s judgment in Guberina,83 where the 
Court clarified for the first time in its jurisprudence that Article 14 of the 
ECHR covered discrimination by association, and that consequently, the 
applicant could claim victim status based on the disability of his child, “with 
whom he had close personal links and for whom he provided care.”84 
There are also a number of other ways in which persons with disabilities 
are in a significantly different position from non-disabled persons with 
regard to their enjoyment of socio-economic rights. First, persons with 
disabilities, especially persons with intellectual disabilities and psychosocial 
disabilities, are often affected in a different way from non-disabled persons 
by violations of a similar nature.85 The psychological and physical effects 
that persons with intellectual disabilities experience as a result of breaches 
of their socio-economic rights and freedoms will usually be greater than 
those suffered by non-intellectually disabled persons due to their different 
level of mental development.86 This is certainly true with regard to the direct 
impact that breaches of the right to an adequate standard of living can have 
on an intellectually disabled person’s psychological state. 
 
 80 See R. Lang, The United Nations Convention on the right and dignities for persons with disability: 
A panacea for ending disability discrimination?, 3 ALTER 265 (2009). 
 81 See, e.g., Tina Stavrinaki, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, in THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 670 (Ilias 
Bantekas et al. eds., 2018) 
 82 See, e.g., Francesco Seatzu, supra note 21. 
 83 Guberina v. Croatia, App. No. 23682/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 28 (2016), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-161530. 
 84 Constantin Cojocariu, Guberina and Gherghina: the two sides of the Court’s disability 
jurisprudence, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (May 17, 2016), 
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2016/05/17/guberina-and-gherghina-the-two-sides-of-the-courts-
disability-jurisprudence/. 
 85 See Monika Domańska, People with Disabilities as a Vulnerable Group. The Concept of 
Protection of the Rights of Vulnerable Groups, 23 BIAŁOSTOCKIE STUDIA PRAWNICZE 28, 29 (2018). 
 86 See How discrimination impacts on the health of people with disability, CRE-DH CTR. RES. 
EXCELLENCE DISABILITY & HEALTH, https://credh.org.au/publications/fact-sheets/how-discrimination-
impacts-on-the-health-of-people-with-disability/ (last visited May 18, 2020). 
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Consider the right to work and employment. Persons with disabilities 
are more acutely affected than non-disabled persons by breaches of their 
right to work and employment.87 While there can be little uncertainty that the 
breach of a non-disabled person’s right to work can impact negatively on 
their lives in terms of, for instance, their capability to gain a living, it is 
probable that the violation of a disabled person’s right to work and 
employment will have more serious consequences. This disparity is in 
consideration of the fact that the employment opportunities for persons with 
disabilities are generally lower than those of non-disabled persons, as 
indirectly confirmed by the available statistics that show that the labor force 
inactivity rate of workers with disabilities tends to be much higher than that 
of other workers.88 This is also indirectly evidenced by the fact (highlighted 
by the current UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities) that persons with disabilities are disproportionately fragile to 
the negative consequences of insecure living and working conditions.89 
Moreover, persons with disabilities who belong to other vulnerable 
groups are more exposed to breaches of their socio-economic rights and 
freedoms than persons with disabilities who do not belong to such groups.90 
All of this depends on their suffering from both the disadvantages and 
fragilities of their condition as persons with disabilities and those deriving 
from detention, non-citizenship, status as an indigenous person, gender, etc. 
For example, it is more likely that women with disabilities will experience 
socio-economic rights breaches more often than those living without—a fact 
that derives from the particular exclusion experienced by such women.91 It 
can be argued that persons with disabilities who suffer such multiple 
disadvantages are the victims of various discriminations at once.  
Finally, persons with disabilities are often potential victims of national 
legislation and policies that are based on the assumption that persons with 
 
 87 Marco Fasciglione, Article 27 of the CRPD and the Right of Inclusive Employment of People with 
Autism, in PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH AUTISM IN THE FIELDS OF EDUCATION AND 
EMPLOYMENT 145 (Valentina D. Fina & Rachele Cera eds., 2015). 
 88 See ARTHUR O’REILLY, THE RIGHT TO DECENT WORK OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (2007), 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---
publ/documents/publication/wcms_091349.pdf. 
 89 Catalina Devandas-Aguilar (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities), Rep. 
of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. Doc. A/70/297, para. 52 
(August 7, 2015). 
 90 See Neta Ziv, The Social Rights of People with Disabilities: Reconciling Care and Justice, in 
EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 369 (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. 
Gross eds., 2007). 
 91 See Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Mining the Intersections: Advancing the Rights of Women and 
Children with Disabilities Within an Interrelated Web of Human Rights, 18 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 293 
(2009). 
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disabilities are unable to exercise the same rights as non-disabled persons, 
and, therefore, focus on rehabilitation and social security instead of fully 
allocating rights.92 Breaches of the socio-economic rights of persons with 
disabilities are generally the result of systemic discriminations and structural 
inequalities.93 Far from being surprising, this is in reality quite natural, 
considering that the effects of discrimination are most clearly felt in the 
sphere of socio-economic rights, in the fields of, for instance, employment, 
housing, transport, cultural life and access to public services.94 
VI. THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
This paragraph makes two considerations, the first one being that of the 
acknowledged general “lack of effective national disability policies that are 
needed to provide a foundation for CRPD implementation.”95 The second is 
“the lack of political will among policymakers for full implementation of the 
CRPD.”96 Against this backdrop, this section then proceeds to argue that 
domestic courts may and should play a strategic role in the domestic 
protection of the socio-economic rights of persons with disabilities. A large 
part of the argument used here implicitly assumes (similar to the drafters of 
the CRPD) that social rights are fully justiciable and immediately claimable 
entitlements. Also, that the “direct protection of social rights as justiciable 
entitlements offers the best opportunity to develop a jurisprudence that 
engages seriously with the content of these rights and the nature and scope 
of the obligations they impose.”97 In so arguing, I consider the circumstances 
in which the domestic courts can be called upon to give effect to the socio-
economic rights of disabled persons. Nevertheless, before so proceeding, 
two general assumptions underlying this consideration shall be pointed out. 
 
 92 See Disabled Persons, ICELAND HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE, http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-
rights-education-project/human-rights-concepts-ideas-and-fora/the-human-rights-protection-of-
vulnerable-groups/disabled-persons (last visited Apr. 26, 2020). 
 93 See Steven J. Hoffman et al., Is the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
Impacting Mental Health Laws and Policies in High-Income Countries? A Case Study of Implementation 
in Canada, BMC INT. HEALTH HUM. RTS. 1 (2016). 
 94 See ICELAND HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE, supra note 92. 
 95 See Raymond Lang et al., Implementing the United Nations Convention on the rights of persons 
with disabilities: principles, implications, practice and limitations, 5 EUR. J. DISABILITY RES. 207, 208 
(2011). 
 96 Id. at 210. 
 97 See NTANDOKAYISE NDHLOVU, PROTECTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN ZIMBABWE, 33 
(2016). 
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The first assumption is that acknowledging socio-economic rights as 
fully justiciable human rights98 means that no difference exists between these 
rights and other fully justiciable human rights.99 There are indeed some 
differences among these categories of human rights, concerning in particular 
their historical origins100 and the role domestic courts play in the enforcement 
and implementation phase. Admittedly, this role is harder to play in the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights. This is given that, unlike civil and 
political rights, social and economic rights are “policy structuring devices 
intended to inform the way a government goes about its business.”101 In fact, 
from this it follows that the government may defend a particular policy 
measure on the grounds of an approach that is different to that taken by the 
competent court in the case. Therefore, owing both to this and the fact that 
socio-economic rights are highly costly to enforce, it is safe to conclude that 
social rights are fully—but differently— justiciable. 
Secondly, it is assumed that, because the fulfillment of socio-economic 
rights normally leads to an increase in the expense of public resources that 
are scarce by definition, the protection of these rights by a domestic court 
could produce a macroeconomic disequilibrium, in the sense that it can 
detract public resources that were bound to satisfy other social or economic 
rights, in which case the court might paradoxically become a factor leading 
to the breach of fundamental socio-economic rights.102 That being said, this 
 
 98 There are a number of sources that recognize approaches in favor of the justiciability of social 
rights. See, e.g., ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AS HUMAN 
RIGHTS, 113 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 2001); ROBERT ALEXY, TEORÍA DE LOS DERECHOS 
FUNDAMENTALES (1997); VÍCTOR ABRAMOVICH & CHRISTIAN COURTIS, LOS DERECHOS DOCIALES 
COMO DERECHOS DXIGIBLES (2nd ed. 2004). On the other hand, there are various critical and more 
skeptical views on the subject as well. See, e.g., GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (2nd ed. 
1991); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights 4 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984); F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation 
and Liberty 57 PHIL. 274 (1973); Rodolfo Arango, Los derechos sociales fundamentales como derechos 
subjetivos 8 PENSAMIENTO JURÍDICO 138 (1998). Finally, for a source against, see S. Kalmanovitz, Las 
consecuencias económicas de los fallos de la Corte Constitucional, 3 ECONOMÍA COLOMBIANA 276 
(1999). 
 99 For example, there is a résumé of the differences between the enforcement of social rights and the 
enforcement of civil and political rights. See, e.g., David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights 
Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT. L. J. 190 (2012). 
 100 See Asbjørn Eide, Economic and Social Rights as Human Rights, in ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 113 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 2001) (stressing that: “the formulation 
of economic and social rights in the Universal Declaration is significantly influenced by the experience 
of industrialization in Western countries.”). 
 101 Danie Brand, The Proceduralisation of South-African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or 
“What are Socio-Economic Rights For?”, in RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: IN A TRANSFORMATIVE 
CONSTITUTION 54 (Henk Botha et al. eds., 2003); See also RORY O’CONNELL ET AL., APPLYING AN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK TO STATE BUDGET ALLOCATIONS 9 (2014). 
 102 See Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, INT’L COMM’N 
JURISTs 1, 6, 9, 25–26, 99 (2008), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a7840562.pdf. 
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is certainly not to suggest that national courts’ decisions on socio-economic 
rights generally have such a negative impact on the protection of other 
fundamental rights. On the contrary, it is simply to say that a negative impact 
could be a possible outcome. The Indian Supreme Court’s practice on the 
implementation of socio-economic rights contains an indirect awareness of 
this possibility.103 And in fact, although the Indian Constitution sets out 
socio-economic rights in a section of the Constitution called “Directive 
Principles of State Policy” that deals with rights not enforceable in courts, 
the Indian Supreme Court has given indirect effect to the Directive Principles 
by interpreting civil and political rights, such as the right to life, to mean the 
right to an adequate quality of life, including adequate nutrition, clothing and 
shelter.104 
But, let me now move back to the possibilities for the domestic courts 
to intervene on issues concerning alleged violations or non-implementation 
of socio-economic rights. For the sake of the exposition, I will examine the 
circumstances in which domestic courts are requested to secure disabled 
persons’ socio-economic rights. First, is the Executive’s failure to respect 
disabled persons’ socio-economic rights.105 Second, there is the Executive’s 
failure to prevent hindrances of third parties in the enjoyment of disabled 
persons’ socio-economic rights.106 Thirdly and lastly, there is the Executive’s 
failure to adopt positive actions and steps to enhance disabled persons’ social 
rights. These three events result in the courts’ operating in different manners 
to secure disabled persons’ social rights. With all that said, it is important to 
acknowledge that socio-economic rights breaches are often complex, not 
least because of the difficulties associated with qualifying austerity measures 
as infringements of these rights.107 This should be kept in mind when 
examining the approaches of the courts considered in this work. 
 
 103 See Surya Deva, Access to justice for socio-economic rights: lessons from the Indian Experience, 
VÖLKERRECHTSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2017), https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/access-to-justice-for-socio-
economic-rights-lessons-from-the-indian-experience/. 
 104 For further references on this issue, see Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, Constitutional 
Law and Policy Division, The Protection of Social and Economic Rights: A Comparative Study, STAFF 
PAPER 11 (1991). 
 105 See Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 9: The Domestic Application 
of the Covenant, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 (Dec. 3, 1998) (stressing that the means used to give 
effect in national law to socio-economic rights should be appropriate in the sense of producing results 
which are consistent with the full discharge of the State party’s duties). See also Janet E. Lord & Michael 
A. Stein, The Domestic Incorporation of Human Rights Law and the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 83 WASH. L. REV. 449, 460 (2008). 
 106 Id. 
 107 See Caroline Mortimer, Government Refuses to Accept Austerity Measures are Human Right, 
INDEPENDENT (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/government-accused-of-
kicking-un-concerns-about-its-austerity-policy-into-the-long-grass-a7569761.html. 
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The role the court is requested to exercise when the Executive does not 
respect disabled persons’ socio-economic rights is substantially undisputed, 
given the fact that it mainly leads to a revision of the state’s conduct. In such 
a circumstance, the court will be demanded to order a stop to the intrusion in 
question: it will not usually be demanded to impose positive measures to be 
adopted by the state in order to guarantee the discharge of the rights in 
question. The second situation, namely the Executive’s failure to prevent 
third party hindrances to the enjoyment of disabled persons’ socio-economic 
rights, may require the courts to adopt positive steps to put an end to the 
intrusion by third parties.108 It seems, however, that this may be difficult in 
the case of the adjudication of persons with disabilities socioeconomic rights, 
given the prominence attributed to civil and political rights and the minor 
attention given to socio-economic rights in the framework of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990,109 where the anti-discrimination approach 
formed the fulcrum around which disability rights protection has revolved.110 
However, it would not be difficult in the normative framework of the CRPD, 
since the CRPD devotes several clauses to the protection of socio-economic 
rights such as Article 24 (right to Education),111 Article 25 (the right to 
health)112 and Article 27 (the right to work and employment).113 Nevertheless, 
these steps are purported to prevent intrusions in the enjoyment of a 
fundamental right. Therefore, as with the first situation, the courts’ actions 
may be considered as purported to restore the status quo ante. 
A court adjudicating a state’s failure to respect and protect is likely to 
prove less controversial than adjudicating the Executive’s failure to adopt 
positive steps to enhance disabled persons’ socio-economic rights, which is 
aimed at changing the status quo ante. And yet this is less controversial, at 
least if one believes (as the majority of constitutional lawyers do) that courts 
have a role to play in the enforcement of constitutional obligations.114 
 
 108 See Amita Dhanda, The right to treatment of persons with psychosocial disabilities and the role 
of the courts, 28 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 155, 155–56 (2005). 
 109 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
 110 See Justice Srem-Sai, The hugger-mugger of enforcing socio-economic rights in Ghana: A threat 
to the rights of persons with disabilities, 3 AFR. DISABILITY RTS. Y.B. 135, 140 (2015) (stressing that: 
“[t]his disregard for socio-economic rights emanates from the ideological arguments that socio-economic 
rights are mere political statements which are not amenable to judicial enforcement; and that they could 
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Nevertheless, it is also clear that the strict linkage between the three 
situations mentioned above implies that courts can have a certain degree of 
flexibility in terms of how they decide to classify fundamental rights 
breaches and state conduct that comes before them. A particularly instructive 
example is offered by the approach of the Supreme Court of India in Ranjit 
Rajak.115 This decision centered on the right of access to work and 
employment of a man who was denied the right to apply for a probationary 
post at the State Bank of India because of a renal transplant in 2004.116 The 
right of access to work of persons with medical disabilities was initially 
considered not to be covered under the prevailing disability law, the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities Act (PWD Act).117 Later, however, the Supreme 
Court found that the right to earn a livelihood of disabled persons had to be 
considered as part of the PWD Act because India had ratified the CRPD.118 
The applicant brought an action seeking, essentially, to be allowed to apply 
for a probationary post at the Bank on the basis that such denial would 
deprive him of his right to life and work guaranteed by the national 
constitution.119 This action was based on a threatened breach by a state organ, 
namely the State Bank of India, of its duty to respect (that is, not to interfere 
with) the medically disabled person’s enjoyment of his right to access to 
public employment and posts.120 However, the Supreme Court’s judgment 
focused extensively on the wider and more encompassing duty of the state 
to take steps to enhance the medically disabled person’s right to work by 
eradicating discriminatory practices.121 This decision shows courts’ ability to 
approach breaches of disabled persons’ socio-economic rights from a variety 
of angles where they are demanded to do so. 
VII. FINAL REMARKS 
This work has demonstrated the emergence of persons with disabilities 
as socio-economic rights holders as a result of the adoption, entry into force, 
and the high number of ratifications of the CRPD. As the analysis above 
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illustrates, the CRPD’s use of the social model of disability instead of the 
medical model combined with its innovative use of non-discrimination, 
equality and social participation provisions and mechanisms have introduced 
new tools that move socio-economic rights closer to civil and political 
rights.122 
Yet, although the innovations within the implementation and 
monitoring provisions are relevant to the fostering, realization, and 
“justiciability” of the socio-economic rights of persons with disabilities, they 
are not sufficient per se to achieve that end, (e.g. to transform the CRPD’s 
text into an actual lever of change in the socio-economic rights field in 
conformity with the intention of its drafters).123 According to this work, in 
order to do this it is indispensable to develop a broad understanding among 
persons with disabilities of the practical importance for them of the socio-
economic rights and freedoms guaranteed in the CRPD, such as the right to 
work and the right to health care, as well as a large understanding of the fact 
that achieving these rights shall become a prioritized goal of the disability 
rights movements and care agencies.124 Moreover, it is also necessary to 
develop and promote a more precise role for the domestic courts in relation 
to the enforcement of disabled persons’ socio-economic rights. And this 
could be done, for instance, by following the above-mentioned example of 
the Supreme Court of India in the Ranjit Rajak case concerning the right to 
work and employment of a person suffering a physical disability.125 
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